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ARCTIC GOVERNANCE PARADIGM AND THE ROLE OF CHINA*
Th e changing environment in the Arctic has had great impact on the global ecosystem and socio-eco-
nomic activities. Th is paper emphasizes that the multilevel paradigm of Arctic governance is a mani-
festation of collective action in dealing with common challenges at global level. At the regional level, 
the Rovaniemi process seeks a common identity from a wide range of actors, encouraging them to 
provide public goods whilst protecting the exclusiveness of their interests. Th e Ilulissat process at the 
sub-regional level is in pursuit of centralizing the cooperation among state actors, facilitating internal 
consultation over specifi c disputes and exclusive jurisdictional restriction. Th is paper also argues that 
China, as a major stakeholder in Arctic governance, has demonstrated its capacity to improve the gov-
ernance structure at global, regional and sectorial levels displaying its willingness to become a practi-
tioner of scientifi c cooperation, a pioneer of ecosystem and environmental protection, a contributor to 
the development of shipping and a promoter of the development of indigenous communities. Refs 45.
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Arctic issues have widely attracted global attention in recent years, largely due to 
the increasing ice-melting rate. Natural sciences usually focus on geographical, climatic 
and ecological issues of the Arctic region, while social scientists discuss the evolution of 
Arctic governance. In the human history of exploring the Earth’s northernmost region, 
the nature of the Arctic as a subject has constantly varied with the changing environment. 
Arctic governance has gradually developed from disorganization to order, 
demonstrating three steps from competition through dispute, then to cooperation, which 
is basically served by the development of science and technology, changing ecology as well 
as the governing policies and strategies of relevant countries. Understanding the Arctic has 
shift ed from a sensitive topic during the Cold War era, to a new platform for multilateral 
cooperation today. With the growing number of diversifi ed actors, increasing cross-border 
challenges and ever more options for cooperation, the international community has 
been taking strenuous eff orts to explore various approaches of Arctic governance so as to 
resolve disputes, tackle challenges and foster new opportunities.
What does the Arctic mean to us? 
First of all, the Arctic is becoming a major victim of climate change. In 2004, the 
Arctic Council (AC) and the International Arctic Science Committee (IASC) have jointly 
published a report on Impacts of a Warming Arctic under the Arctic climate impact 
assessment project, which emphasizes that over the past 30 years, the annual average sea-
ice extent has decreased by about 8%, or nearly one million square kilometers, an area 
larger than Norway, Sweden, and Denmark combined, and the melting trend is accelerating 
[1]. From 1979 to 2012, the Arctic sea-ice extent has declined more dramatically than the 
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annual average, with a loss of 3.5–4.1 % of ice coverage per decade [2]. Sea ice is thinner 
in recent decades, with arctic-wide average thickness reductions estimated at 10–15 %, 
and with particular areas showing reductions of up to 40 % between the 1960s and late 
1990s [1]. According to the latest statistics, the Arctic sea ice extent average for November 
2015 was the sixth lowest in the satellite data record, and monthly ice extent in November 
from 1979 to 2015 shows a decline of 4.7 % per decade [3].
Th is scientifi c forecast has refl ected two diff erent considerations: Most states believe 
environmental changes would be a disaster for the world’s North Pure Land, concerned 
about the crash of marine ecological systems, others recognize this trend as an opportunity 
of increased economic activity. Despite its economic potential, signifi cant environmental 
and infrastructure challenges will constrain resource and transport activities in the Arctic.
Second, the Arctic may become an alternative core corridor of international shipping. 
It does not only suff er through the process of melting sea-ice, glaciers and permafrost, 
as well as increased coastal activities [4]. It also has the potential to become a transport 
corridor with the Northeast Passage (NEP) encompassing the route along the Norwegian 
and Russian Arctic coasts, and the Northwest Passage (NWP) through the Canadian 
Archipelago and North of Alaska. Th e Northern Sea Route (NSR) is a part of the NEP, 
while their diff erence is that the NEP comprises the Barents Sea and provides access to 
the port of Murmansk [5]. NSR is formally defi ned in Russian law as extending from the 
Novaya Zhelaniya straits to Cape Dezhnev by the Bering Strait [6]. In the summer of 2008, 
for the fi rst time in history, two voyages have been completed via both the NSR and the 
NWP, which focused attention among all major shipping countries. 
According to estimated statistics, the sailing distance from port Yokohama of Japan via 
the NEP to the port of Rotterdam in the Netherlands could be cut more than 4000 nautical 
miles, 37 % than traditional route of Suez Canal. Voyage from the port of Seattle to the 
port of Rotterdam via the Northwest Passage saves 2000 nautical miles range and 25 % of 
the shipping cost as opposed to the traditional route through the Panama Canal [7]. Th e 
NSR was frequently used by Soviet shipping companies during Soviet Union times, and 
the peak of transit and domestic shipping by using NSR was set in 1987 with total 6.7 tons 
of cargo volume, involving 331 ships over 1306 voyages. Together with the dissolution of 
the USSR, the demands for using the NSR were sharply reduced and total cargo volume 
in 2000  was only 1.5  million tones. Statistics shows that the NSR has been used from 
four transits in 2010 with traffi  c increased to 71 in 2013. Cargo volumes also grew from 
2010  to 2013  and fell slightly in 2013. But  it is worth noting that most of commercial 
transits cannot be recognized as international transits, since the origin and destination 
ports may be all Russian. In 2013, 28 transits were reported between Russian ports from 
total 71 transits, 19 of them were full trans-Arctic voyages completely traversing the Arctic 
[8]. With unprecedented climate-driven loss of sea ice over last 35  years and growing 
international trade supported by the rise of Asian economics, Arctic shipping shows more 
promise of being navigable. Further development of port infrastructure will enable the 
NEP to become a seasonal shipping route or even an alternative corridor of Suez Canal.
Finally, the Arctic has become a potential exploitation area of hydrocarbons. In 
1962, huge oil and gas fi elds were discovered in Tazovskiy district of Soviet Union, which 
became a milestone of natural resource development in the Arctic. In 2008, United States 
Geological Survey published the Arctic resource assessment: Circum-Arctic Resource 
Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle, which estimates 
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the total undiscovered oil and gas resources in the Arctic Circle. Th e sum of the mean 
estimates for each province indicates that 90 billion barrels of oil, 1,669 trillion cubic feet 
of natural gas, and 44 billion barrels of natural gas liquids may remain to be found in 
the Arctic, of which approximately 84 percent is expected to occur in off shore areas [9]. 
Th is survey estimates that 22 percent of the world’s oil and natural gas could be located 
beneath the Arctic, Russia’s vast energy resources account for 52 % of the Arctic totals 
and Norway 12 % of that [9]. According to report of Russian Academy of Science, Russia’s 
undiscovered petroleum is estimated between 142 tons of oil equivalent (BTOE) [10]. As 
of 2013, Russia exported 88 % of crude oil via pipelines, with a large majority of natural 
gas also transported in that manner. 76 % percent of natural gas and 79 % of oil were 
exported to Europe, with China and Japan as second largest oil and natural gas customers, 
respectively. Russia continued to expand both its pipeline networks and its seaborne 
capacity, with absolute maritime transportation of petroleum growing but remaining a 
small portion of the overall exports [11]. Norway, which has been extracting petroleum 
in the North Sea since the 1970s, expected new discoveries in the Barents Sea in the 2010s 
[12]. Apparently, the economy of the region is based largely on natural resources, from 
oil, gas and metal ores to fi sh, reindeer, whales, seals and birds. In recent decades, tourism 
has been added as a growing sector to the economies of many communities and regions 
of the Arctic. 
Arctic governance: a Multilevel governance paradigm
In political sciences, governance represents a process of interaction between diff erent 
public and private actors, political actors and the growing interdependence between 
them as the interaction between societies and institutions become ever more complex 
and diverse [13]. Since the beginning of the twenty-fi rst century, globalization has 
exacerbated the need for normative understanding of governance, as Robert Keohane 
has noted, interdependence and the lack of governance, when combined, make a deadly 
mixture[14], especially the disjuncture that exists between emerging global cross-border 
issues and governance structures. Richard Higgott indicates that globalization has become 
the principal metaphor around which political contest over the governance of the modern 
world order is being conducted [15]. Governance, under conditions of globalization, is 
no longer something to be researched in separate contexts, with the boundary of the state 
determining the location at which policy issues are addressed. In addition, the importance 
of the link between normative and practical questions in relation to multi-level governance 
continues to grow. In this case, the Arctic governance in the context of climate change, 
globalization, formulates a multilevel paradigm includes global, regional and sub-regional 
elements of governance.
Global level: common challenge formulated collective action 
Global governance is defi ned by scholars as the complex of formal and informal 
institutions, mechanisms, relationships, and processes between and among states, markets, 
citizens and organizations, both inter- and non-governmental, through which collective 
interests on the global plane are articulated, right and obligations are established, and 
diff erences are mediated [16]. In contrast to the traditional meaning of governance, some 
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authors like James Rosenau have used the term global governance to denote the regulation 
of interdependent relations in the absence of an overarching political authority [17].
At a global level, governance might be seen as an approach in which individuals 
and institutions are attempting to accommodate confl icting interests through processes 
of collective action decision making in a range of areas operating usually beyond state 
borders. Under the scope of Arctic governance at the global level, collective actions require 
governmental involvement on most common challenges like climate change, which 
should also include other channels of communication and especially other prominent 
and emerging non-state actors at a global level such as local or international enterprises 
in the fi shery sector, banks and fi nancial institutions on development of shipping and 
natural resources exploitation, as well as civil society such as NGOs, scientifi c forums and 
scientifi c groups which generate trans-national mechanisms of governance and networks 
across the range of functional policy domains [18–19]. 
Pluralistic actors of Arctic governance at the global level have a diversifi ed structure, 
including both state and non-state actors such as a horizontal structure, central government, 
local government and self-governed indigenous people as a longitudinal structure, also 
including countries within and without the Arctic region, members and non-members of 
international organizations as a composite structure. It is noteworthy that within the dual 
structure of state and non-state actors, how to defi ne the scope of related states is particul
arly important. For example, the constituent elements of the Arctic are the Arctic Ocean, 
issues related with marine resources and the environment which can be applied to the 
jurisdiction of UNCLOS. Th eoretically speaking, all signatory parties of the convention 
may also be considered as actors of Arctic governance at the global level, but only on such 
issues without geographical or jurisdictional characteristics such as acidifi cation of the 
Arctic Ocean, protection of biodiversity and maritime ecosystem, prevention of maritime 
pollution, etc., the common challenges of theabove-mentioned issues stimulate collective 
action for all types of actors. 
Th e Rovaniemi process: public goods-oriented multilateral interaction
At the regional level, governance is based on institutions, its process of consultations 
within the institutional framework, which has signifi cant regional features [20]. Scholars 
have long argued that one common feature provides a way to increase cooperation on 
regional public goods by increasing participation in regional institutions, building 
consensus, and deterring free-riders. Th e Arctic exhibits certain common features 
such that any single issue can be aff ected by other sectors and blur the border between 
topics that follow general criteria, such as protecting the Arctic maritime ecosystem, 
reducing Arctic pollution, animal and plant protection, etc. Th e performance of regional 
governance dependings on the ability and willingness of actors in contribution to the 
public good, through design of a multilateral, multidimensional and multi-sectorial 
cooperative institutions. In this regard, various institutions such as AC, the Barents Euro-
Arctic Council, the Nordic Council, the Nordic Council of Ministers have been designed 
to promote common identity and exclusive interests, to ensure that actors are willing to 
use their resources and provide public goods in concern.
Th e Rovaniemi process is originated from the Arctic Environmental Protection 
Strategy in 1991, which initiated cooperation on environmental protection in the Arctic. 
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Signatory states of this document are committed to contribute in sharing of pollution 
data, control and respond to external inputs of pollution, and deepen cooperation 
in environmental protection [21]. On the institutional building level, AC as a core 
achievement has been established in 1996 with several working groups within this regular 
meeting mechanism.
In terms of formulating common identity, AC has accepted a wide range of actors 
including Arctic states, non-arctic states, indigenous groups and other intergovernmental 
institutions. Like all other similar regional governance mechanisms with growing 
numbers of participants, together with increased resources of public goods providers, the 
effi  ciency of decision making and policy implementation faces more diffi  culties. Th us, 
the Rovaniemi process has also created various codes of conduct between diff erent actors, 
such as recognition of sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction of Arctic states in the 
Arctic; recognition of existing legal frameworks like UNCLOS, which provides a solid 
foundation for responsible management of the Arctic ocean; respect of the values, interests, 
culture and traditions of Arctic indigenous peoples and other Arctic inhabitants. Th e AC’s 
observers are encouraged to demonstrate a political willingness as well as fi nancial ability 
to contribute in the work of the Permanent Participants (PPs) and other Arctic indigenous 
peoples. Observers are welcomed to support the work of the AC through partnerships 
with member states and by bringing Arctic concerns to global decision-making bodies. 
With the contribution of multilateral interaction between actors, the Agreement on 
Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic as a fi rst public 
good result was passed during the Nuuk meeting held in 2011, which was the fi rst legal-
binding agreement since the founding of AC [22].
In terms of protecting the exclusiveness of interests, the scope of access and 
responsibility for observers is defi ned with restriction. In Nuuk  Declaration [23] and 
Annexes to the SAO Report [24] issued by AC in 2011 during the Arctic Senior Arctic O
ffi  cials meeting, as actors with limited access, observers could express their willingness 
only through member states, without any right of veto on any specifi c topic. Decisions 
at all levels in the Arctic Council are the exclusive right and responsibility of the eight 
Arctic States with the involvement of the Permanent Participants. All decisions are taken 
by consensus of the Arctic States. Th e primary role of observers is to observe the work of 
the Arctic Council. Furthermore, observers are encouraged to continue to make relevant 
contributions through their engagement primarily at the level of working groups [25]. 
Th e Rovaniemi process clarifi es the relations between Arctic states and other countries 
as actors with limited access, specifi es the standards, methods and paths of introducing 
external infl uence, for conservation of exclusiveness of rights.
In order to improve the suffi  ciency of projects under the AC, actors with limited 
access are welcomed through various working groups of the AC to make fi nancial support 
for research or other projects.  It is worth-noting  that the  amount of  funding activities 
has to be less than the contribution of actors with full access. Actors with limited access 
are required to get approval  of the  member states with a rotating presidency,  before 
submitting a written or oral opinion on related issues, and these opinions must be expressed 
aft er actors with full access [25]. By admitting actors with limited access participation in 
this way, the AC has reached its dual goals of restriction and exploitation, and eff ectively 
enhanced the importance of the Arctic in the global politics.
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Th e Ilulissat process: centralized cooperation with jurisdictional features 
On sub-regional Arctic governance, state actors play a dominant role within the 
geographic-based institutions, emphasizing the traditional model of governance with 
the jurisdictional features. As a typical example, the Ilulissat process was intiated from a 
Ministerial meeting of fi ve Arctic coastal states in 2008. At that meeting, states discussed 
issues related to climate change, the marine environment, safety of navigation, among 
others. In the Ilulissat Declaration signed at the end of the meeting, all fi ve countries 
declared that there is no need to develop a new comprehensive international legal regime 
to govern the Arctic Ocean [26]. Coastal states are committed to settle possible confl icts 
under the legal framework of UNCLOS.
Although this meeting mainly focused on legal system and jurisdiction on Arctic 
Ocean as Coastal states have claimed, no other Arctic states including Iceland, Finland, 
Sweden, as well as indigenous peoples’ organizations were not invited to participate, 
Topics discussed in the meeting are not confi ned in the rights and obligations concerning 
the delineation of the outer limits of the continental shelf, the protection of the marine 
environment, freedom of navigation, marine scientifi c research, and use of maritime 
resources in the Arctic Ocean are also included, which closely connected with interests of 
all countries, who has the ability of international shipping, fi shing and scientifi c research. 
Despite a wide range of common interests among Arctic states, there still exists potential 
or even ongoing competing elements over agenda-setting caused by unbalanced power 
and ability. For actors such as Denmark and Norway, the disadvantage of comprehensive 
national power produces a huge willingness though bilateral cooperation with other 
Arctic states or even stakeholders from external regions, using external power to maintain 
strategic balance with big players like Canada, Russia and United States. Under the sub-
regional Arctic governance, non-coastal states like Iceland, Finland and Sweden are also in 
inferior positions compered with coastal states, seeking approaches for balance of power 
via cooperation with outsiders. Th e successful launch of the fi rst round of bilateral dialogue 
on Arctic issue between China and Iceland in November 2015 [27] was a typical example 
of this trend. Iceland’s president has called for an expanded role for China and other Asian 
countries in the future of the Arctic, arguing that the rapid melting of the summer sea 
ice was having eff ects far beyond the region [28]. Th e Ilulissat process seeks to establish 
a governance mechanism with qualifi ed actors, centralizing the cooperation among state 
actors, facilitating internal consultation over specifi c maritime delimitation disputes and 
exclusive jurisdictional restriction for other participants from external region.
China’s role: a multilevel stakeholder in the Arctic governance
Unfortunately, as a county with one-fi ft h of the world’s population and one of the 
largest consumers of oil and natural gas products, every step made by China regarding 
Arctic has been recognized as challenge to others. Th e China threat has become a hot 
topic in media highlights [29] while a lot of unoffi  cial arguments of scholars about China’s 
Arctic involvement are misinterpreted [30]. In fact, the changing natural environment and 
resource exploration of the Arctic have a direct impact on China’s climate, environment, 
agriculture, shipping, trade as well as social and economic development. China is a 
multilevel stakeholder in the Arctic.
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At the global level, a multilevel stakeholder should be assumed with big power 
responsibility in the international organizations like the United Nations to contribute to the 
Arctic environment governance and ecologic protection. Th e importance of environmental 
protection should be insisted and any exploration at the cost of the environment should be 
opposed. In practice, as a global economic power, a Permanent Member of the UN Security 
Council, a signatory to the UNCLOS and an important constructor of many international 
regimes of environment protection, China is playing a leading and coordinating role in 
issues of peace-keeping, rationally handling the contradiction between state sovereignty 
and the common heritage of mankind, balancing between interests of the Arctic countries 
and those of the non-Arctic countries, and protecting the fragile Arctic environment and 
the common home of mankind. In fact, Arctic governance includes not only high-politics, 
but also low-politicized agenda such as climate change and environmental protection, 
which requires the provision of public goods and contributions made by competent actors. 
At the regional level, a multilevel stakeholder should play a positive role in Arctic 
regional organizations, strengthen ties and communication with governance organizations 
such as the AC, and highlight the necessity of the outsider countries’ participation. In 
practice, China has been an active player in Arctic scientifi c research and cooperation. 
Chinese experts have also been active in the research projects of several working groups 
under the AC. Th e international scientifi c community regards China’s polar-scientists as 
an important contingent in addressing persistent questions of polar science. Since Arctic 
governance needs a system involving land, marine, sky and space technologies to monitor 
and prevent disaster outbreak, China is precisely one of the very few countries equipped 
with the technology systems and the conditions and capabilities to provide Arctic R&D 
and economic activities with the public goods [31].
At the sectorial level, a multilevel stakeholder should also increase its vigor of 
participation in domains and functional issues of navigation, resource exploration and 
others, in order to allow the future mechanisms and arrangements take global interests 
into account. Development of new shipping routes brings new opportunities for Chinese 
trade and shipping. China has been involved in formulating the Polar Code by the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) in a constructive manner. Chinese merchant 
ships are exploring the possibility of sailing the Arctic sea routes [32]. 
Moreover, a multilevel stakeholder can provide public goods necessary for the Arctic 
governance, which can play a direct role in fulfi lling tasks of governance. As the largest 
developing country, Chinese issues are closely related to the process of globalization itself. 
Economic exploitation of the Arctic region will facilitate the formation of an industry 
chain and a profi t chain and Arctic environmental protection will form a responsibility 
chain and a contribution chain going beyond the Arctic region. China is highly valued by 
some Arctic countries for its funds, market, and strength in infrastructure construction 
and resource exploitation. However, 88–95 % of resources in the Arctic fall within one 
of the fi ve Arctic Ocean coastal states’ Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ’s) and China has 
never challenged that provision within UNCLOS. China has only a few businesses joining 
relevant programs of economic development or natural resources exploitation through 
partnership with companies of Arctic states. For example, the Yamal liquid natural gas 
(LNG) project is a typical model of China’s involvement into Arctic resource exploitation. 
In November 2008, Gazprom announced that it has prepared a list of potential partners 
for the LNG plant of the Yamal project. Th e project proposed a LNG plant at Sabetta, 
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north-east of the Yamal Peninsula of Russia [33], which is expected to cost US$27 billion 
[34]. Th e planned LNG plant will have three trains with total capacity of 16.5  million 
tonnes of liquefi ed natural gas per year [33]. Th e fi rst train will be operational by the end 
of 2017 and the full capacity will be achieved by 2021 [35]. Although one of the biggest 
Chinese state-owned companies, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), was 
involved into this project, Russia’s largest independent natural gas producer Novatek still 
owns 50.1 % stake of this project, the French company Total S. A. and CNPC own 20 % 
respectively, China’s Silk Road Fund has also signed agreement to purchase a 9.9 % stake 
[36]. In fact, China is not a major performer of this big project with its space of activity 
controlled by major investors. 
China’s self-conception: a constructive partner in cooperation 
Although the offi  cial Arctic policy or strategy of China has not been published yet, 
statements from high level governmental representatives are rather clear. Th e Arctic’s 
clear territorial jurisdiction and legal status is totally diff erent from those of the Antarctic. 
Th erefore, China will in no way attempt to apply the Antarctic Treaty to the Arctic or 
establish any new legal mechanism, taking national sovereignty in the Arctic as the 
primary legal basis for dealing with Arctic aff airs [37]. China holds that the AC is one 
of the most infl uential regional inter-governmental organizations dealing with Arctic 
aff airs, which has played an important role in coordinating Arctic scientifi c research, 
promoting cooperation on Arctic environmental protection and sustainable development 
[38]. China has also proposed six specifi c policies with regard to Arctic aff airs, including 
further exploration and understanding of the Arctic, protection and proper utilization of 
the Arctic, respecting the inherent rights of Arctic countries and the indigenous people, 
valuing the rights of non-Arctic countries and the overall interests of the international 
community, building a multi-tiered Arctic cooperation framework for win-win results, 
and upholding the Arctic governance system based on existing international law [39]. In 
particular, China’s role within the current Arctic governance structure can be divided into 
four dimensions. 
In the fi st place, China is a practitioner of Arctic scientifi c cooperation. China has 
started its own Arctic activity from scientifi c exploitation since the 1920s. In 1925, China 
acceded to the Svalbard Treaty, which marked the beginning of China’s participation in 
Arctic aff airs. Since the 1990s, China’s involvement in Arctic activities has mainly focused 
on scientifi c research. China has successfully conducted six scientifi c expeditions [40] 
and set up the Arctic Yellow River Station, thus establishing a basic Arctic observation 
system. China has joined the IASC in 1996, and its experts have been active in the research 
projects of several working groups under the Arctic Council. 
Second, China is a pioneer of the Arctic ecosystem and environmental protection. 
As the biggest developing country, China actively participated in the global process on 
climate change, making itself the fi rst developing country to issue National Climate Ch
ange  Program. Also, China has joined UNFCCC, Convention on Biological Diversity 
and other international conventions which associated with ecological and environmental 
protection of the Arctic. China can contribute to Arctic environmental protection by 
reducing its gas emissions. In fact, China in 2014 spent around $115 billion on solar and 
wind power and other forms of renewable energy, putting it far ahead of the European 
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Union and the United States for investment [41]. China aims to cut its greenhouse gas 
emissions per unit of gross domestic product by 60–65 % from 2005 levels under a plan 
submitted to the United Nations ahead of COP21: UN climate change conference held in 
Paris last year [42].
Th ird, China is a contributor of Arctic shipping development. As the biggest trade 
partner and a potential user of shipping routes, China has been involved in formulating 
the Polar Code by the IMO in a constructive manner. As shallow waters limit vessel size 
and ice movements lead to unpredictability of shipping lanes, the NEP is a less reliable 
seasonal alternative to the Suez Canal, especially for container transport, but it still makes 
up great short-term potential [43]. Chinese merchant ships are exploring the possibility 
of taking the Arctic sea routes, China Ocean Shipping (Group) Company (COSCO) is 
actively studying the feasibility of operating regular services on the northern route [44], 
mature external trade market of China will drive Arctic shipping development, leading to 
a growth of destinational shipping traffi  c along the NEP.
Fourth, China is a promoter of indigenous community development. A multilevel 
stakeholder should pay great attention on the social responsibility of a cooperator in 
the region while conducting economic, scientifi c and technical cooperation with Arctic 
countries, demonstrating humanitarian concerns and environmental concerns in 
host countries to its investment and cooperation. China has paid great attention to the 
development of the indigenous peoples of Arctic. In 2013, China hosted the fi ft h World 
Reindeer Herders Congress, seeking through appropriate programs to provide fi nancial 
support to support the capacity building in the indigenous people.
Conclusion
Arctic governance focuses on interaction between multi-actors, and a multilevel 
governance paradigm performs collective actions in dealing with common challenges at 
global level. Th e AC as a major institution of the Rovaniemi process at the regional level is 
seeking for common identity from a wide range of actors. Arctic states, non-Arctic states, 
indigenous groups and other intergovernmental institutions are encouraged to provide 
public goods under diff erent working groups and research programs within the AC, while 
protecting exclusiveness of interests by limiting the scope of access and responsibility 
for observers. At the sub-regional level, the Ilulissat  process is seeking to centralize 
cooperation among state actors, facilitating internal consultation over specifi c maritime 
delimitation disputes and exclusive jurisdictional restriction for other participants from 
external region.
Although misconceptions about China’s intention in Arctic governance are still 
popular worldwide, China’s role has already been implanted in all governance levels, 
from big power responsibility in international organizations to contribute to the Arctic 
environment governance, combating climate change and enhancing ecologic protection at 
global level, assuming a positive role in the Arctic regional organizations, to strengthening 
ties and communication with governance organizations such as the AC at regional level, 
also from a major participant of rule-setting process of Arctic shipping to a provider of 
funds and market for resource exploitation and development of indigenous people. 
Th e future of the Arctic concerns not only the well-being of the Arctic countries 
and people, but also the overall interests of the entire international community. In this 
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increasingly globalized world, it is all the more important for parties to jointly explore, 
understand and utilize the Arctic. With further deepening of the impact of climate 
change, development of globalization and scientifi c and technological progress, a certain 
lag of demands and institutional diffi  culties of governance paradigm is becoming the most 
urgent problem. Th e necessity of updating the fl exibility and adaptability of the Arctic 
governance paradigm from all levels will be the top priority for future development of the 
Arctic. 
A unifi ed  approach to Arctic issues has not been identifi ed. Whether in a global 
context or in the circle of Arctic states, scholars have not reached a consensus on basic 
principle, forms, channels and shares of Arctic governance, the path of governance is still in 
the discussion with a variety of diff erent options [45]. Meanwhile, in addition to dialogue 
and cooperation between developing and developed countries, between Arctic and Non-
arctic countries, disagreements still exist on the establishment of the the mechanism, 
distribution of responsibility and transfer of interests. With deepening cooperation in 
the Arctic, concepts and values will gradually fi nd consensus based on common needs 
among multiple actors. A developing, diversifi ed governance mechanism and options are 
promoting progressive development of regional governance to more opened multilateral 
governance. 
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